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Abstract
We introduce a modification of Perron’s method, where semi-solutions are considered in a care-
fully defined asymptotic sense. With this definition, we can show, in a rather elementary way,
that in a zero-sum game or a control problem (with or without model uncertainty), the value
function over all strategies coincides with the value function over Markov strategies discretized in
time. Therefore, there are always discretized Markov ε-optimal strategies, (uniform with respect
to the bounded initial condition). With a minor modification, the method produces a value and
approximate saddle points for an asymmetric game of feedback strategies vs. counter-strategies.
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1 Introduction
The aim of the paper is to introduce the Asymptotic Perron’s Method, i.e. constructing a solution of
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Belman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation as the supremum/infimum of carefully defined
asymptotic semi-solutions. Using this method we show, in a rather elementary way, that the
value functions of zero-sum games/control problems can be (uniformly) approximated by some simple
Markov strategies for the weaker player (the player in the exterior of the sup/inf or inf/sup). From
this point of view, we can think of the method as an alternative to the shaken coefficients method of
Krylov [Kry00] (in the case of only one player, under slightly different technical assumptions), or to
the related method of regularization of solutions of HJBI’s by S´wie¸ch in [S´wi96a] and [S´wi96b] (for
control problems or games in Elliott-Kalton formulation). The method of shaken coefficients has been
recently used to study games in Elliott-Kalton formulation in [BN] under a convexity assumption (not
needed here).
While the result on zero-sum games (under our standing assumptions) is rather new, but certainly
expected, the goal of the paper is to present the method. To the best of our knowledge, this modi-
fication of Perron’s method does not appear in the literature. In addition, we believe that it applies
to more general situations than we consider here, and either using a stochastic formulation (as in the
present work) or an analytic one (see Remark 3.2). Compared to the method of shaken coefficients
of Krylov, or to the regularization of solutions by S´wie¸ch, the analytic approximation of the value
function/solution of HJB by smooth approximate solutions is replaced by the Perron construction.
The careful definition of asymptotic semi-solutions allows us to prove that such semi-solutions work
well with Markov strategies. The idea of restricting actions to a deterministic time grid is certainly not
new, we just provide a method that works well for such strategies/controls. The arguments display
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once again the robustness of the Perron construction, combined with viscosity comparison. There
is basically a large amount of freedom in choosing the definition of semi-solutions, as long as they
compare (as a simple consequence of their definition) to the value functions. Here, we consider such
asymptotic semi-solutions.
Perron’s method and it’s possible modifications seem to be rather useful in dynamic programming
analysis. One could use Ishii’s arguments (see [Ish87]) to construct a viscosity solution and later up-
grade it’s regularity (if possible) for the purpose of verification (as in [JS12]) or employ a modification
of Perron’s method over stochastic semi-solutions, if one does not expect smooth solutions (see [BS12],
[BS14] and [BS13]). Furthermore, with an appropriate definition of semi-solutions in the stochastic
sense and a suitable model, one can even treat games and problems with model uncertainty, where
dynamic programming is particularly cumbersome (see [S1ˆ4c], [S1ˆ4a]). The present work represents
an additional step in this program of using Perron’s method and some possible offshoots to approach
dynamic programming (DP) without having to first prove the dynamic programming princi-
ple (DPP). This step, unlike the previous (non-smooth) ones actually provides a stronger conclusion
than the usual Dynamic Programming (DP) approach. More precisely, it proves the existence of
approximate simple Markov strategies (like [Kry00], or [S´wi96a], [S´wi96b]) something that is unclear
from the DPP alone.
The formulation of the games/control problems we consider is resembling of the formulation of
deterministic games/control problems in the seminal work [KS88b]. What we do here is to propose a
novel method to study such models in stochastic framework.
Beyond the particular results obtained here, the (analytic version of the) method seems to also
be useful in proving convergence of numerical schemes (but probably not the rate of convergence) in
the spirit of Barles-Souganidis [BS91], or in the study of discretized games with mixed strategies as
in [BLQ14]. We do not pursue this direction here.
Compared to the so called Stochastic Perron Method employed in [S1ˆ4c] or [BS13], the method we
introduce here is quite different. The idea in [S1ˆ4c] and [BS13] was to use exact semi-solutions in the
stochastic sense then do Perron. In order to do so, the flexibility of stopping rules or stopping times
was needed, leading to the possibility to complete the analysis only over general feedback strategies
(elementary for the purpose of well posed-ness of the state equation) or general predictable controls.
Here, we propose instead to use asymptotic semi-solutions in the Perron construction. The flexibility
on this end, allows us to work with a deterministic time grid, resulting in approximation over Markov
strategies. Obviously, the analytic part of the proof (the “bump-up/down” argument) is similar to
[S1ˆ4c] or [BS13], but those parts of the proof were already similar to the (purely analytic) arguments
of Ishii for viscosity Perron [Ish87].
2 Set-up and Main Results
We use the state equation and the standing assumptions from [S1ˆ4c].
The stochastic state system:{
dXt = b(t,Xt, ut, vt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, ut, vt)dWt,
Xs = x ∈ Rd. (1)
We assume that u and v belong to some compact metric spaces (U, du) and (V, dV ), respectively. For
each s, the problem comes with a fixed probability space (Ω,P,F), a fixed filtration F = (Ft)s≤t≤T
satisfying the usual conditions and a fixed Brownian motion (Wt)s≤t≤T , with respect to the filtration
F. We suppress the dependence on s all over the paper. We emphasize that the filtration may
be strictly larger than the saturated filtration generated by the Brownian motion. The coefficients
b : [0, T ]× Rd × U × V → Rd and σ : [0, T ]× Rd × U × V →Md×d′ satisfy the
2
Standing assumptions:
1. (C) b, σ are jointly continuous on [0, T ]× Rd × U × V
2. (L) b, σ satisfy a uniform local Lipschitz condition in x, i.e.
|b(t, x, u, v) − b(t, y, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v) − σ(t, y, u, v)| ≤ L(K)|x− y|
∀ |x|, |y| ≤ K, t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U, v ∈ V for some L(K) <∞, and
3. (GL) b, σ satisfy a global linear growth condition in x
|b(t, x, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)
∀ |x|, |y| ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U, v ∈ V for some C <∞.
Perron’s method is a local method (for differential operators), so we only need local assumptions,
except for the global growth which ensures non-explosion of the state equation and comparison for
the Isaacs equation (see [S1ˆ4c]).
Consider a bounded and continuous reward (for the player u) function g : Rd → R. Fix an initial
time s ∈ [0, T ]. We are interested in the optimization problem
sup
u
inf
v
E[g(Xs,x;u,vT ]
which is formally associated to the lower Isaacs equation{ −vt −H−(t, x, vx, vxx) = 0,
v(T, ·) = g(·). (2)
Above, we use the notations
H−(t, x, p,M) , sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
L(t, x, u, v, p,M),
L(t, x, u, v, p,M) , b(t, x, u, v) · p+ 1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v)M
)
.
It is well known that making sense of what u, v should be above is a non-trivial issue, aside from
relating the optimization problem to the Isaacs equation. We expect that three possible models are
actually represented as solutions of the lower Isaacs equation. They are
1. the lower value of a symmetric game over feedback strategies (as in [PZ14] or [S1ˆ4c]),
2. the value function of a robust control problem where u is an intelligent maximizer and v is a
possible worst case scenario modeling Knigthian uncertainty (see [S1ˆ4a]), or
3. the genuine value of a sup-inf/inf-sup non symmetric game over feedback strategies vs. feedback
counter-strategies (as in [KS88b][Section 10] or [FHH11], [FHH12]).
Although the main goal of the paper is to present the novel modification of Perron’s method, we also
want provide a unified treatment for the three models above. Therefore, some modeling considerations
need to be taken into account (on top of the ones we simply borrow from [S1ˆ4c] or [S1ˆ4a]). More
precisely, depending on the information structure, one has two types of zero-sum games. The first,
and fully symmetric one, is where both players observe the past of the state process X (only), and
therefore, make decisions based on this. In this model, both players use feedback strategies, i.e. non-
anticipative functionals of the path X· (this is the case in [PZ14] or [S1ˆ4c]). On the other hand, one
can envision a game where player u can only see the state, but the player v observes the state, and,
in addition, the control u (in real time). The intuition corresponding to the nature of the problem,
tells us that the advantage that the player v can gain from observing the whole past of the control u
actually comes only from being able to adjust, instantaneously to the observation ut. In other words,
in such a model we use a (counter) strategy for player v that depends on
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1. the whole past of the state process X up to the present time t
2. (only) the current value of the adverse control ut.
This modeling avenue for deterministic games is taken in Section 10 of the seminal monograph [KS88b]
and followed up in the important work on stochastic games [FHH11], [FHH12].
Definition 2.1 (Feedback Strategies and Counter-Strategies) Fix a time s.
1. a feedback strategy for player u is a mapping
α : [s, T ]× C[s, T ]→ U,
which is predictable with respect to the (raw) filtration on the path space
Bt , σ(y(q), s ≤ q ≤ t), ∀t ∈ [s, T ].
A similar definition holds for the player v.
2. a feedback counter-strategy for the player v is a mapping
γ : [s, T ]× C[s, T ]× U → V,
which is measurable with respect to Ps ⊗ U b/V. The second player uses, at time t, the action
vt = γ(t,X·, ut),
where ut is the action of the player u at time t. Above, Ps is the predictable sigma-field on
[s, T ]×C[s, T ] with respect to the raw filtration on the path space and U b is the Borel sigma-field
on U with respect to the metric dU .
The definition of counter-strategies goes back to [KS88b] (see, for example, the Definition on page 431
for a Markovian version) and the name is also borrowed from there. Feedback strategies have been
used in control/games for a long time, and it is hard to trace their exact origin. It is clear that, for a
fixed pair of feedback strategies (α, β) (or a feedback strategy vs. a feedback counter-strategy (α, γ))
the state equation may fail to have a solution. Therefore, we need some restrictions on strategies (and
counter-strategies). We use here (for strategies, there is) the restriction to elementary strategies in
[S1ˆ4c].
Definition 2.2 (Elementary feedback strategies and counter-strategies) Fix s.
1. (see [S1ˆ4c]) an elementary feed-back strategies (for the u-player) is a predictable functional of the
path α : [s, T ]×C[s, T ]→ U, which is only ”rebalanced” at some stopping rules τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ ... ≤ τn.
More precisely, there exists n and some
τk : C[s, T ]→ [s, T ], k = 1, 2, . . . , n such that ∀k, {τk ≤ t} ∈ Bt, s ≤ t ≤ T,
and there also exist some
ξk : C[s, T ]→ U, with ξk ∈ Bτk−1
so that
α(t, y) =
n∑
k=1
1{τk−1(y)<t≤τk(y)}ξk(y), ∀ s ≤ t ≤ T, y ∈ C[s, T ].
A similar definition holds for player v. We denote by A(s) and B(s) the collections of elemen-
tary (pure) feed-back strategies for the u-player and the v-player, respectively.
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2. an elementary feed-back counter-strategy for the v-player is a mapping
γ : [s, T ]× C[s, T ]× U → V,
for which there exist stopping rules τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ ... ≤ τn as above and some
ηk : C[s, T ]× U → V, with ηk ∈ Bτk−1 ⊗ U b
so that
γ(t, y, u) =
n∑
k=1
1{τk−1(y)<t≤τk(y)}ηk(y, u), ∀ s ≤ t ≤ T, y ∈ C[s, T ], u ∈ U.
We denote by C(s) the set of elementary counter-strategies of the v-player.
We also denote by U(s) and V(s) the set of open-loop controls for the u-player and the v-player,
respectively. Precisely,
V(s) , {v : [s, T ]× Ω→ V | predictable with respect to F = (Ft)s≤t≤T },
and a similar definition is made for U(s). Since the number of symbols may become overwhelming,
we will use for notation
1. α, β for the feedback strategies of players u and v,
2. u, v for the open loop controls,
3. γ for the feedback counter-strategy of the second player v.
The only reason to restrict feedback strategies or counter-strategies to be elementary, is to have well
posed-ness of the state equation (actually in the strong sense).
Lemma 2.3 Fix s, x. Assume that the first player uses an open-loop control u ∈ U(s) or an elemen-
tary feedback strategy α ∈ A(s). Assume also that the second player uses either an open-loop control
v ∈ V(s) or a feedback strategy β ∈ B(s) or a counter-strategy γ ∈ C(s) . Then the state equation has
a unique strong solution.
The result has been briefly proven in [S1ˆ4c] and [S1ˆ4a] with the possible exception of both players
using open-loop controls (where the result is both obvious, and not really used here) and the case
when the second player uses a counter strategy γ. We treat here the case when the second player uses
an elementary counter-strategy γ.
1. (u, γ). If an open-loop control u and a counter-strategy γ are fixed, one has to solve the state
equation, iteratively, in between stopping rules τk−1, τk. This is possible since, in between this
stopping rules, the state equation has no “feedback”, but it really looks like an open-loop vs.
open-loop equation. In other words, assume that the state equation is well posed up to the
stopping rule τk−1 and the value of the process at that time (i.e. the random variable Xτk−1(X·))
is L2). Once the state process ”has arrived” to the stopping rule τk−1 one can start solving
the SDE with an initial random time (rather than stopping rule) τk−1(X·) and initial condition
Xτk−1(X·) and using the predictable open-loop controls
(ut)τk−1(X·)≤t≤T , (ηk(X·, ut))τk−1(X·)≤t≤T ,
on the stochastic interval τk−1(X·) ≤ t ≤ T . This can be solved due to the locally Lip and linear
growth assumptions and results in a square integrable process X defined from τk−1(X·) forward.
We let this run up to the next stopping rule τk and then continue as above. The result is a
unique strong and square integrable solution X.
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2. (α, γ) If an elementary feedback strategy α ∈ A(s) and an elementary counter-strategy γ ∈ C(s)
are chosen, one has to simply see that the super-position of the counter-strategy over the strategy
is an elementary strategy. In other words
γ[α](t, y) , γ(t, y, α(t, y)) ∀s ≤ t ≤ T, y ∈ C[s, T ]
defines a γ[α] ∈ B(s). For α, γ[α] the state equation is well-posed (see [S1ˆ4c]) therefore it is well
posed over α, γ.
The state process X will be used with some explicit (and obvious) super-script notation Xs,x;·,·.
Following [S1ˆ4c] we first define the lower value function (only) for the symmetric game in [S1ˆ4c] in
between two feedback players:
V −(s, x) , sup
α∈A(s)
(
inf
β∈B(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,βT )]
)
. (3)
Next, following [S1ˆ4a] we consider a robust control problem where the intelligent player u uses feedback
strategies and the open-loop controls v parametrize worst case scenarios/Knightian uncertainty:
v−(s, x) , sup
α∈A(s)
(
inf
v∈V(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,vT )]
)
. (4)
We recall that the filtration may be larger than the one generated by the Brownian motion. Finally,
following [KS88b] or [FHH11] we consider a genuine game (with a lower and an upper value) in between
two intelligent players who can both observe the state, but the second player has the advantage of
also observing first player’s actions in real time, i.e.
W−(s, x) , sup
α∈A(s)
(
inf
γ∈C(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,γT )]
)
≤ inf
γ∈C(s)
(
sup
α∈A(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,γT )]
)
, W+(s, x). (5)
In addition to this, for mathematical reasons, we define yet another value function
v+(s, x) , inf
γ∈C(s)
(
sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;u,γT )]
)
≥W+(s, x). (6)
We could attach to v+ the meaning of some robust optimization problem, but this is not natural, since
the intelligent optimizer v can see in real time the “worst case scenario”. By simple observation we
have v− ≤ W− ≤ W+ ≤ v+. In addition, since B(s) ⊂ C(s), and according the to second part of the
proof of Lemma 2.3, for any fixed α ∈ A(s), γ ∈ C(s) we have γ[α] ∈ B(s), we actually see that
sup
α∈A(s)
(
inf
γ∈C(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,γT )]
)
≤ sup
α∈A(s)
(
inf
β∈B(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,βT )]
)
≤ sup
α∈A(s)
(
inf
γ∈C(s)
E[g(X
s,x;α,γ[α]
T )]
)
,
i.e. W− = V −. Altogether, we know that
v− ≤W− = V − ≤W+ ≤ v+.
Remark 2.4 Since the state equation is well posed, the counter-strategies γ ∈ C(s) (and, therefore,
the feedback strategies β ∈ B(s)) are all strategies in the sense of Elliott-Kalton [EK72] (or [FS89] for
the stochastic case). Therefore, there is a natural question: since, in the non-symmetric game (5) the
player v observes u, why not formulate the game as a sup/inf and inf/sup over Elliott Kalton strategies
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vs. open-loop controls? In other words, we could set up the problem (with little rigor in formulation)
as
sup
u
inf
e
E[g(Xs,x;u,eT )] ≤ infe supu E[g(X
s,x;u,e
T )]
where e is an Elliott-Kalton strategy. The lower value of the game above is, heuristically (quite obvious
in the deterministic case), equal to the lower value of the symmetric game over open-loop controls and
the upper value above is expected (according to [FS89]) to be the solution of the lower Isaacs equation
(or, the unified Isaacs equation if the Isaacs condition holds). Therefore, (a possible modification of)
the well known example of Buckdahn (Example 8.1 in [PZ14]) shows that such game may fail to have
a value. On the other hand, the non-symmetric game over feedback strategies vs. counter-strategies
will have a value (see Theorem 2.7 below), showing that the information structure considered in (5) is
better suited to analyze a non-symmetric game of this type. Elliott-Kalton strategies are designed to
be considered only in the exterior of the inf-sup/sup-inf, i.e. only in the upper value above.
We now define a very special class of elementary strategies, namely, simple Markov strategies.
Actually, what we call simple Markov strategies below are called ”positional strategies ” in [KS88b]
(see the Definition on page 12 and relation (3) on page 6, for example) and are used extensively in
deterministic games. Similar strategies/counter-strategies are used under different names in the more
recent interesting contributions [FHH11], [FHH12] on asymmetric zero-sum games.
Definition 2.5 (time grids, simple Markov strategies and counter-strategies) Fix 0 ≤ s ≤
T .
1. A time grid for [s, T ] is a finite sequence π of s = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T .
2. Fix a time grid π as above. A strategy α ∈ A(s) is called a simple Markov strategy over π if
there exist some functions ξk : R
d → U, k = 1, . . . , n measurable, such that
α(t, y(·)) =
n∑
k=1
1{tk−1<t≤tk}ξk(y(tk−1)).
The set of all simple Markov strategies over π is denoted by AM (s, π). Define the set of all simple
Markov strategies, over all possible time grids as
AM (s) ,
⋃
pi
AM(s, π).
3. Fix a time grid π as above. A counter-strategy γ ∈ C(s) is called a simple Markov counter-
strategy over π if there exist some functions ηk : R
d × U → V, k = 1, . . . , n measurable, such
that
γ(t, y(·), u) =
n∑
k=1
1{tk−1<t≤tk}ηk(y(tk−1), u).
The set of all simple Markov counter strategies over π is denoted by CM (s, π). Define the set of
all simple Markov counter-strategies, over all possible time grids as
CM (s) ,
⋃
pi
CM (s, π).
In words, for a strategy ”simple Markov” means that the player only changes actions over the time
grid, and anytime he/she does so, the new control depends on the current position only. However,
for “simple Markov counter-strategies”, the situation stands in stark contrast: actions are changed
continuously in time based on the instantaneous observation of u, but the information from observing
the state is only updated discretely over π.
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Remark 2.6 If we attempt to fully discretize counter-strategies as well, allowing for the v-player to
only update his/her actions over the time grid π, one cannot expect the game (5) to have a value, since
the opponent u can change actions many times in between tk−1 and tk. One would need to restrict
both players to the same time grid π then to pass to the limit over π (in the spirit of [BLQ14]) to
obtain a value over fully discretized counter-strategies.
Consider now the same optimization problems as above, but where the weaker player is restricted to
using only simple Markov strategies/counter-strategies, restricted to a fixed time grid, or not. Denote
by
v−pi (s, x) , sup
α∈AM (s,pi)
(
inf
v∈V(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,vT )]
)
≤ v−(s, x) ≤W−(s, x) = V −(s, x),
and
v−M (s, x) , sup
α∈AM (s)
(
inf
v∈V(s)
E[g(Xs,x;α,vT )]
)
= sup
pi
v−pi (s, x) ≤ v−(s, x) ≤W−(s, x) = V −(s, x),
as well as
v+pi (s, x) , inf
γ∈CM (s,pi)
(
sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;u,γT )]
)
≥ v+(s, x) ≥W+(s, x),
and
v+M (s, x) , inf
γ∈CM (s)
(
sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;u,γT )]
)
= inf
pi
v+pi (s, x) ≥ v+(s, x) ≥W+(s, x).
The main result is that the u-player (in either setting) cannot do better with general feedback
strategies than with simple Markov strategies, and the v player can do as well over simple Markov
counter-strategies as over general (elementary) ones. The non-symmetric game (5) has a value and
admits approximate saddle points over simple Markov strategies/simple Markov counter-strategies.
This is certainly expected. Under slightly stronger technical assumption (natural filtration, global
Lipschitz conditions) this is proven in [FHH11] with different methods, and is also pursued in Section
10 of [KS88b] for deterministic games. The one player (i.e. control) case is well studied (again with
different methods) in the seminal monograph [Kry09] (see subsection 4.1 for more comments).
The whole idea of approximating the problem over controls/strategies that are fixed over time
grids is by no means novel. It goes much further than [KS88b] for games or [Kry09] in control. The
main contribution of the paper is to obtain such results with a different (and more elementary) method
(and under slightly different assumptions).
Theorem 2.7 Under the standing assumptions, we have that
v−M = v
− =W− = V − =W+ = v+ = v+M
and the common value is the unique bounded continuous viscosity solution of the lower Isaacs equa-
tion. In particular, the non-symmetric game (5) has a value which is equal to the lower value of the
symmetric game (3). For each N , and each ε > 0, there exists δ(N, ε) > 0 such that
∀s ∈ [0, T ],∀ |π| ≤ δ, ∃ αˆ ∈ AM(s, π), γˆ ∈ CM (s, π)
such that ∀ |x| ≤ N, we have
0 ≤W−(s, x)− inf
v∈V(s)
E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,vT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤v−pi (s,x)
≤ ε and 0 ≤ sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;u,γˆT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥v+pi (s,x)
−W+(s, x) ≤ ε.
Therefore, v−pi , v+pi → V − =W− =W+ as |π| → 0 uniformly on compacts in [0, T ]× Rd.
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The result above can be rewritten as
E[g(Xs,x;u,γˆT ]−ε ≤W+(s, x) = V −(s, x) =W−(s, x) ≤ E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,vT ]+ε (∀) (u, v) ∈ U(s)×V(s), |x| ≤ N,
(this is the way the result is phrased in the very interesting paper [FHH11]). Plugging in above the
open-loop controls
uˆt = αˆ(t,X
s,x;αˆ,γˆ
· ), vˆt = γˆ(t,X
s,x;αˆ,γˆ
· , uˆt)
we obtain that |E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,γˆT ]− V −(s, x)| ≤ ε. This yields
E[g(Xs,x;u,γˆT ]− 2ε ≤ E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,γˆT ] ≤ E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,vT ] + 2ε (∀) (u, v) ∈ U(s)× V(s), |x| ≤ N,
which is stronger than
E[g(Xs,x;α,γˆT ]− 2ε ≤ E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,γˆT ] ≤ E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,γT ] + 2ε (∀) (α, γ) ∈ A(s)× C(s), |x| ≤ N.
This means that (αˆ, γˆ) is actually a 2ε-saddle point for the (genuine) non-symmetric game (5).
3 Proof: the Asymptotic Perron’s Method
We introduce here the new version of Perron’s method, where semi-solutions of the (lower) Isaacs
equations are replaced by asymptotic semi-solutions. In our particular framework, we use asymptotic
stochastic semi-solutions (so the Perron Method here is asymptotic in the stochastic sense of [S1ˆ4c]
or [BS13]). However, we claim that a similar Asymptotic Perron Method can be designed in the
analytic framework (see Remark 3.2).
The definition of asymptotic semi-solutions is different from the definition of stochastic semi-
solutions in [S1ˆ4a] or [S1ˆ4c], and, consequently, so are the proofs. The analytic part of the proof still
resembles Ishii [Ish87] and the probabilistic part uses Itoˆ along the smooth test function, but this is
where similarities stop. As mentioned, the method we introduce here, since it comes in close relation
to Markov strategies, can be viewed as an alternative to the powerful method of shaken coefficients of
Krylov, [Kry00] or to the work of S´wie¸ch [S´wi96a] and [S´wi96b]. Anyway, in the case of games, the
method of S´wie¸ch actually works for a slightly different game, defined on a space accommodating an
independent Brownian motion, and using Elliott-Kalton strategies. Since we are ultimately studying
a non-symmetric game (5), the analysis has to be done separately for the two value functions.
3.1 Asymptotic Perron over strategies
We perform here a sup Perron construction lying below the value function v−M . If one only cares about
the lower value of the game V − in (3) or the robust control problem (4), this is the only construction
we need. Together with the results in [S1ˆ4c] this provides a full approximation of the two problems
by elementary Markov strategies of the player u. We regard this as the most important result.
Definition 3.1 (Asymptotic Stochastic Sub-Solutions) A function w : [0, T ]×Rd → R is called
an asymptotic (stochastic) sub-solution of the (lower) Isaacs equation, if it is bounded, continuous and
satisfies w(T, ·) ≤ g(·). In addition, there exists a gauge function ϕ = ϕw : (0,∞)→ (0,∞), depending
on w such that
1. limεց0 ϕ(ε) = 0,
2. for each s (and the optimization problem coming with it), for each time s ≤ r ≤ T , there exists
a measurable function ξ : Rd → U such that, for each x, each α ∈ A(s) and v ∈ V(s), if we make
the notation α[r, ξ] ∈ A(s), defined by
α[r, ξ](t, y(·)) = 1{s<t≤r}α(t, y(·)) + 1{r<t≤T}ξ(y(r)),
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then, for each r ≤ t ≤ T we have
w(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) = w(r,X
s,x;α[r,ξ],v
r ) ≤ E[w(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξ],vt )|Fr] + (t− r)ϕ(t− r) a.s. (7)
Denote by L the set of asymptotic sub-solutions.
Remark 3.2 The definition of asymptotic solutions, tell us, that, for each r there exists a Markov
control at that time, such that, if the control is held constant until later, the state equation plugged
inside w will almost have the sub-martingale property in between r and any later time (reasonably
close), for any choice of open loop controls v. Since v can change wildly after r, in this framework
it is very convenient to consider asymptotic sub-solutions in the stochastic sense, resembling [S1ˆ4c] or
[BS13]. However, if the open loop controls are restricted to not change very soon after r, one could
consider asymptotic sub-solutions in analytic formulation. Without pursuing this direction here, in
the definition of such a sub-solution, the inequality (10) could be replaced by
w(r, x1) ≤
∫
Rd
w(t, z)p(r, t, x1, x2; ξ(x1), v)dx2 + (t− r)ϕ(t− r),∀x1 ∈ Rd, v ∈ V.
Here, p(r, t, x1, x2, u, v)dx2 is the transition law from time r to t of the state process X where u, v
are held constant (which is, obviously a Markov process). Such definition, as mentioned above, would
work well if controls v do not change in between r and t, and would amount to ”analytic asymptotic
Perron’s method”, as opposed to the stochastic set-up we follow below.
Compared to [S1ˆ4c], the next Proposition is not entirely trivial, but not hard either.
Proposition 3.3 Any w ∈ L satisfies w ≤ v−M ≤ v− ≤W− = V −.
Proof: Fix ǫ and let δ such that ϕ(δ) ≤ ε. Choose a time partition such that tk − tk−1 ≤ δ. For
this particular partition, we construct, recursively, going from time tk−1 to time tk, some measurable
ξk : R
d → U satisfying the Definition 3.1. Now, we have, with α formally defined as in the Definition
3.1 of simple Markov strategies, that, for the simple Markov strategy α we have constructed,
w(tk−1,X
s,x;α,v
tk−1
) ≤ E[w(tk,Xs,x;α,vtk )|Ftk−1 ] + (tk − tk−1)ϕ(tk − tk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ε
a.s. ∀k.
This happens for any x and any open loop control v. Taking expectations and summing up, we
conclude that
w(s, x) ≤ E[w(T,Xs,x;α,vT )] + ε× (T − s),∀v ∈ V(s).
Taking the infimum over v, since w(T, ·) ≤ g(·), we conclude that, if |π| ≤ δ there exists α ∈ AM (s, π)
such that
w(s, x) ≤ inf
v∈V
E[g(Xs,x;α,vT )] + ε× (T − s) ≤ vpi(s, x) + ε× (T − s) ∀x ∈ Rd.
Letting εց 0 we obtain the conclusion. ⋄
Remark 3.4 We could let the gauge function ϕ in Definition 3.1 depend on the control ξ (or even
the time r) as well, to make the method even more flexible, but we just don’t need that here. However,
dependence on ξ makes a difference if one wants to treat unbounded controls, rather than the compact
case we consider here.
The next lemma is rather obvious.
Lemma 3.5 The set of asymptotic sub-solutions is directed upwards, i.e. w1, w2 ∈ L implies w1∨w2 ∈
L.
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Proof: the only important thing in the proof is to notice that one can choose the gauge function
ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 for w = w1 ∨ w2. The choice of ξ is obvious. ⋄
Asymptotic Perron’s Method for strategies: we define
w− , sup
w∈L
w ≤ v−M ≤ v− ≤W−.
Proposition 3.6 (Asymptotic Perron) The function w− is an LSC viscosity super-solution of the
(lower) Isaacs equation.
Proof: from Proposition 4.1 in [BS12], there exist w˜n ∈ L such that w− = supn w˜n. We define the
increasing sequence wn = w˜1 ∨ · · · ∨ w˜n ∈ L ր w−.
1. Interior super-solution property Let ψ touch w− strictly below at some (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )×Rd.
Let us assume, by contradiction, that the viscosity super-solution property fails at (t0, x0). This means
that
ψt(t0, x0) + sup
u
inf
v
L(t0, x0, u, v;ψx(t0, x0), ψxx(t0, x0))) > 0.
Since L is continuous, we can choose a small neighborhood B(t0, x0; ε) ⊂ [0, T )×Rd and some uˆ ∈ U
such that, over this neighborhood we have
ψt(t, x) + inf
v
L(t, x, uˆ, v;ψx(t, x), ψxx(t, x))) > ε.
From here, we follow the usual Perron construction. The very different part will be to show that, after
we “bump up” (an approximation of) w−, it still stays an asymptotic sub-solution. More precisely,
we know that, since ψ touches w− below in a strict sense, there exists room of size δ > 0 in between
w− and ψ over the compact (rectangular) torus
T , B(t0, x0, ε)−B(t0, x0, ε/2),
i.e. w− ≥ ψ + δ on T. A Dini type argument (see, for example, [BS14]) shows that, one of the terms
w , wn actually satisfies w ≥ ψ + δ/2 on T. Define now, for 0 < ρ << δ/2 the function
vˆ =
{
w ∨ (ψ + ρ), on B(t0, x0; ε)
w, outside B(t0, x0; ε).
Note that vˆ = w on the overlapping T (so, it is continuous) and vˆ(t0, x0) = w
−(t0, x0)+ρ > w−(t0, x0).
The proof would be finished if we can show that vˆ is an asymptotic sub-solution.
The idea of the proof is quite simple, namely:
1. if, at time r, we have w ≥ ψ+ρ (at that particular position y(r)), then, we follow from r forward
the nearly optimal strategy corresponding to the asymptotic sub-solution w (which depends only
on y(r))
2. if, at time r, we have instead w < ψ+ρ (again, at that particular position y(r)) we follow from r
forward the strategy uˆ. In between r and any later time t, the process ψ+ γ super-posed to the
state equation is not a true sub-martingale, but is an asymptotic one. The reason is that, it is
a sub-martingale until the first time it exits B(t0, x0; ε). However, the chance that this happens
before t can be estimated in terms of the size of the interval t−r, and bounded above by a gauge
function.
We develop rigorously below the arguments described above. Fix s ≤ r ≤ T . Since w is an asymptotic
sub-solution, there exists a Markov strategy ξ at time r corresponding to the Definition 3.1 for the
sub-solution w (for the initial time s). Now, we define
ξˆ(x) = 1{(r,x)/∈B(t0,x0;ε/2)∨w(r,x)≥ψ(r,x)+ρ}ξ(x) + 1{(r,x)∈B(t0 ,x0;ε/2)∧w(r,x)<ψ(r,x)+ρ}uˆ.
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We want to show that ξˆ satisfies the desired property in the Definition 3.1 for the (expected) sub-
solution vˆ at r, with an appropriate choice of the gauge function ϕ independent of r, s or ξˆ. Let
ϕw be the gauge function of the sub-solution w. Consider any α ∈ A(s) and any v ∈ V(s). By the
definition of the sub-solution w, and, taking into account that w ≤ vˆ we have that, on the event
A , {(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) /∈ B(t0, x0; ε/2)} ∪ {w(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) ≥ ψ(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) + ρ} ∈ Fr
we have that X
s,x;α[r,ξ],v
t = X
s,x;α[r,ξˆ],v
t a.s. for r ≤ t ≤ T and, therefore
1Avˆ(r,X
s,x;α,v
r ) = 1Aw(r,X
s,x;α,v
r ) ≤E[1Aw(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξ],vt )|Fr]+
+1A × (t− r)ϕw(t− r) ≤E[1Avˆ(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt )|Fr] + 1A × (t− r)ϕw(t− r).
(8)
On the complement of A, the process ψ(t,X
s,x;α[r,ξˆ],v
t ) is a sub-martingale (by Itoˆ) up to the first time
τ where the process gets out of B(t0, x0; ε), i.e. up to
τ , inf{t ≥ r|(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ]t ) /∈ B(t0, x0; ε)}.
The sub-martingale property says that
1Ac(ψ + ρ)(r,X
s,x;α,v
r ) ≤ E[1Ac(ψ + ρ)(τ ∧ t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vτ∧t )|Fr] ≤ E[1Ac vˆ(τ ∧ t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vτ∧t )|Fr].
Fix t such that r ≤ t ≤ r + ε/2. Denote now the event
B , {|Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt′ − x0| < ε,∀ r ≤ t′ ≤ t}.
We use here the norm |(t, x)) , max{|t|, |x|}. Consequently, we have
E[1Ac vˆ(τ ∧ t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vτ∧t )|Fr] = E[1Ac1B vˆ(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt )|Fr] + E[1Ac1Bc vˆ(τ,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vτ )|Fr].
Therefore,
E[1Ac vˆ(τ ∧ t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vτ∧t )|Fr] =E[1Ac vˆ(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt )|Fr]+
+E[1Ac1Bc
(
vˆ(τ,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vτ )− vˆ(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt )
)|Fr].
Since vˆ is bounded by some constant ‖vˆ‖∞, we conclude that, for r ≤ t ≤ r + ε/2 we have
1Ac vˆ(r,X
s,x;α,v
r ) =1Ac(ψ + γ)(r,X
s,x;α,v
r ) ≤
≤E[1Ac vˆ(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt )|Fr] + 2‖vˆ‖∞P[Ac ∩Bc|Fr], a.s.
(9)
We can now put together (8) and (9). If we can find a gauge function ϕ˜ such that
2‖vˆ‖∞P[Ac ∩Bc|Fr] ≤ 1Ac ϕ˜(t− r)× (t− r), a.s.
we are done, as one can choose the gauge function for vˆ as
ϕvˆ , ϕw ∨ ϕ˜.
We do that in the Lemma 3.7 below, and finish the proof of the interior sub-solution property.
Lemma 3.7 There exist constants C,C ′ (depending only on the function v) such that, for any s and
any r ≥ s, if t ≥ r is close enough to r we have
P[Ac ∩Bc|Fr] = 1AcP[Ac ∩Bc|Fr] ≤ 1AcC ′P
(
N(0, 1) ≥ 1
C
√
t− r
ε
4
)
a.s,
independently over all strategies α ∈ A(s) and controls v ∈ V. The function
ϕ˜(t) ,
2‖v‖∞C ′
t
P
(
N(0, 1) ≥ 1
C
√
t
ε
4
)
satisfies limtց0 ϕ˜(t) = 0 and therefore is a gauge function.
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Proof: To begin with, we emphasize that we do not need such a precise bound on conditional prob-
abilities, to finish the proof of Theorem 2.7 (both the interior super-solution part or the terminal
condition). The simple idea of the proof is to see that, conditioned on Ac, the event we care about
amounts to a continuous semi-martingale with bounded volatility and bounded drift to exit from a
fixed box in the interval of time [r, t]. If the size of t − r is small enough, that amounts to just
the martingale part exiting from a smaller fixed box in between t and r. This can be rephrased,
through a time change, in terms of a Brownian motion, and estimated very precisely to be of the order
P
(
N(0, 1) ≥ 1
C
√
t−r
ε
4
)
= o(t− r), where N(0, a2) is a normal with mean zero and standard deviation
a. This is basically the whole proof, in words. The precise mathematics below follows exactly these
lines. We first notice that
Ac ∩Bc ⊂ {(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) ∈ B(t0, x0; ε/2) and Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt′ /∈ B(t0, x0; ε), for some r ≤ t′ ≤ t}.
If t− r < ε/2 we have
Ac ∩Bc ⊂ {(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) ∈ B(t0, x0; ε/2) and |Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt′ −Xs,x;α[r,ξ]r | ≥ ε/2, for some r ≤ t′ ≤ t}.
Over B(t0, x0; ε) both the drift and the volatility of the state system are uniformly bounded by some
constant C. Therefore, if we choose t− r ≤ ε4C the integral of the drift part cannot exceed ε/4 in size.
We, therefore, conclude that,with the notation
D , {(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) ∈ B(t0, x0; ε/2)} ,
if t− r ≤ ε2 ∧ ε4C , then
Ac ∩Bc ⊂ D ∩
{∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t′
r
σ(q,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vq , α[r, ξˆ](q,X
s,x;α[r,ξˆ],v
· ), vq)dWq
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε/4 for some r ≤ t′ ≤ t
}
.
Denote by
Mt′ ,
∫ t′
s
σ(q,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vq , α[r, ξˆ](q,X
s,x;α[r,ξˆ],v
· ), vq)dWq,∀ s ≤ t′ ≤ T.
We study separately the coordinates. More precisely we consider on Rd the max norm as well, and,
for Mt′ = (M
1
t′ , . . . ,M
d
t′), we also have
Ac ∩Bc ⊂
d⋃
l=1
(D ∩ {ρl ≤ t}) ,
where
ρl , inf{r ≤ t′ ≤ τ ||M lt′ −M lr| ≥ ε/4}.
We estimate the probabilities above (conditioned on Fr) individually. We want to use the result of
Dambis-Dubins-Schwarz to translate the computation into a probability of exiting from a fixed box
of a Brownian Motion. In order to do so rigorously, and without enlarging the probability space
to accommodate an additional Brownian motion, we first need to make the volatility explode at T .
Choose any function
f → [s, T )→ (0,∞),
∫ t
s
f2(q)dq <∞ ∀q < T,
∫ T
s
f2(q)dq =∞.
Fix some ε′ > 0 such that t0 + ε < T − ε′, so τ ≤ T − ε′ on D. Define
M ε
′
t′ ,
∫ t′
s
(
1{s≤q≤T−ε′}σ(q,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vq , α[r, ξˆ](q,X
s,x;α[r,ξˆ],v
· ), vq) + 1{T−ε′<q≤T}f(q)
)
dWq,∀s ≤ t′ < T.
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We have
ρl = inf{r ≤ t′ ≤ τ ||M ε
′,l
t′ −M ε
′,l
r | ≥ ε/4}.
According to Dumbis-Dubins-Schwarz (see [KS88a], page 174) applied with the obvious shift of time
origin from r to zero, the process (Zs′)0≤s′<∞ defined as
Zs′ =M
ε′,l
As′
−M ε′,lr , 0 ≤ s′ <∞, for As′ = inf{t′ ≥ r|〈M ε
′,l〉t′ − 〈M ε′,l〉r > s′}.
is a Brownian motion with respect to the filtration Gs′ , FAs′ , 0 ≤ s′ <∞. Therefore, since Fr ⊂ G0,
Z is independent of Fr. In addition, still from DDS, we have
M ε
′,l
t′ −M ε
′,l
r = Z〈Mε′,l〉t′−〈Mε′,l〉r , r ≤ t
′ < T.
On the other hand, since σ is uniformly bounded (independently on the strategy and the control) on
D and before τ (the exit time from B(t0, x0; ε)) occurs we have
〈M ε′,l〉t′ − 〈M ε′,l〉r ≤ C2(t′ − r), r ≤ t′ ≤ τ ≤ T − ε′.
We then conclude that
D ∩ {ρl ≤ t} ⊂
{
max
0≤s′≤C2(t−r)
|Zs′ | ≥ ε/4
}
.
Let M+t and M
−
t the distributions of the running max and running min of a standard BM starting at
time zero. Since the Brownian motion Z is independent of Fr, we can obtain that
P(D ∩ {ρl ≤ t}|Fr) ≤ P(M+C2(t−r) ≥ ε/4) + P(M−C2(t−r) ≥ ε/4) = 2P(M+C2(t−r) ≥ ε/4).
It is well know, from the reflection principle, (see, for example, Karatzas and Shreve [KS88a] page 80)
that this is the same as
P(D ∩ {ρl ≤ t}|Fr) ≤ 4P(N(0, C2(t− r)) ≥ ε/4) = 4P
(
N(0, 1) ≥ 1
C
√
t− r
ε
4
)
.
We emphasize that all estimates are independent of the initial time s, the later time r and the even
later time t as long as t− r ≤ ε2 ∧ ε4C (and independent of α ∈ A(s) and of v ∈ V(s)). Summing all
the terms, we obtain
P[Ac ∩Bc|Fr] ≤ 4dP
(
N(0, 1) ≥ 1
C
√
t− r
ε
4
)
, if t− r ≤ ε
2
∧ ε
4C
.
We can multiply now with 1Ac which is measurable with respect to Fr to obtain the conclusion. It is
well known that
P
(
N(0, 1) ≥ 1
C
√
t
ε
4
)
t
→ 0, as tց 0,
and this finishes the proof of the lemma. Instead of appealing to Dambis-Dubins-Scwhwarz theorem,
we could also use the (smooth solution) characterizing the exit probably of a Brownian motion from
a box, and super-pose it to the state process, resulting in a super-martingale (just using Itoˆ formula).
This would still bound the probability we are interested in by the exit probability of a standard
Brownian motion from a box.⋄
Proof of Proposition 3.6, continued:
2. The terminal condition w−(T, ·) ≥ g(·) The proof of this is done again, by contradiction.
The ”bump-up” analytic construction we use is similar to [BS13], and the rest is based on similar
arguments to the interior super-solution property and a very similar estimate to Lemma 3.7 above.
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The only difference, if the Dambis-Dubins-Schwarz route is followed, is to see that, with all notations
as above, if r ≤ t < T, then
{ρl ≤ t} = lim
ε′ց0
{ρl ≤ t ∧ (T − ε′)} = lim
ε′ց0
{|M ε′,lt′ −M ε
′,l
r | ≥ ε/4 for some r ≤ t′ ≤ τ ∧ t ∧ (T − ε′)}.
We can first let ε′ ց 0 to obtain the conclusion that (with the same notation vˆ for the ”bump-up”
function), with the gauge function we just chose in the proof of the Lemma above we have
vˆ(r,Xs,x;α,vr ) ≤ E[vˆ(t,Xs,x;α[r,ξˆ],vt )|Fr] + (t− r)ϕ(t− r) a.s
for all t ∈ [r, T ) close enough to r, i.e. t − r ≤ ε2 ∧ ε4C . Obviously, letting t ր T we obtain the same
for t = T . The proof is now complete. ⋄
3.2 Asymptotic Perron over counter-strategies
One only has to go through this construction if the genuine (non-symmetric) game in (5) is studied. The
notion of counter-strategies (even with the Markov discretization) is still not so easily implementable,
since actions do change continuously in time (if u does so, in a situation of counter-strategies vs. open
loop-controls as in the definition (6) of of v+, which describes some strange model of ”worst case
scenario”, analyzed here for mathematical reasons only). On the other hand, there is no way one can
genuinely discretize counter-strategies to obtain a value in (5) (see Remark 2.6). Therefore, we go
over this analysis for mathematical completeness, emphasizing that the basic method and the more
important result are contained in the previous Subsection 3.1. We view this as a simple additional
application of the Asymptotic Perron method. The definitions and proofs follow in lockstep with the
previous Subsection 3.1, with minor appropriate modifications to account for counter-strategies.
Definition 3.8 (Asymptotic Stochastic Super-Solutions) A function w : [0, T ] × Rd → R is
called an asymptotic (stochastic) super-solution of the (lower) Isaacs equation, if it is bounded, contin-
uous and satisfies w(T, ·) ≥ g(·). In addition, there exists a gauge function ϕ = ϕw : (0,∞)→ (0,∞),
depending on w such that
1. limεց0 ϕ(ε) = 0,
2. for each s (and the optimization problem coming with it), for each time s ≤ r ≤ T , there exists
a measurable function η : Rd × U → V such that, for each x, each γ ∈ C(s) and u ∈ U(s), if we
make the notation γ[r, η] ∈ C(s), defined by
γ[r, η](t, y(·), u) = 1{s<t≤r}γ(t, y(·), u) + 1{r<t≤T}η(y(r), u),
then, for each r ≤ t ≤ T we have
w(r,Xs,x;u,γr ) = w(r,X
s,x;u,γ[r,η]
r ) ≥ E[w(t,Xs,x;u,γ[r,η],t )|Fr]− (t− r)ϕ(t− r) a.s. (10)
Denote by U the set of asymptotic super-solutions.
We again have:
Proposition 3.9 Any w ∈ U satisfies w ≥ v+M .
Proof: Fix ǫ and let δ such that ϕ(δ) ≤ ε. Choose π such that ‖π‖ ≤ δ. For this partition π, we
construct, recursively, going from time tk−1 to time tk, some measurable ηk : Rd × U → V satisfying
the Definition 3.8. We put the ηk’s together to obtain a Markov counter-strategy γ for which
w(tk−1,X
s,x;u,γ
tk−1
) ≥ E[w(tk,Xs,x;u,γtk )|Ftk−1 ]− (tk − tk−1)ϕ(tk − tk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ε
a.s. ∀k.
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This happens for any x and any open loop control u. Taking expectations and summing up, we
conclude that
w(s, x) ≥ E[w(T,Xs,x;u,γT )]− ε× (T − s),∀u ∈ U(s).
Taking the supremum over u, since w(T, ·) ≥ g(·), we conclude that, if |π| ≤ δ there exists γ ∈ CM (s, π)
such that
w(s, x) ≥ sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;u,γT )]− ε× (T − s) ≥ v+pi (s, x)− ε× (T − s) ∀x ∈ Rd.
Letting εց 0 we obtain the conclusion. ⋄
The next lemma is, once again, obvious.
Lemma 3.10 The set of asymptotic super-solutions is directed downwards, i.e. w1, w2 ∈ U implies
w1 ∧ w2 ∈ U .
Proof: the only thing needed is to notice that one can choose the gauge function ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 for
w = w1 ∨ w2. The choice of η is, again, obvious. ⋄
Asymptotic Perron’s Method for counter-strategies: we define
w+ , inf
w∈U
w ≥ vM+ ≥ v+ ≥W+.
Proposition 3.11 (Asymptotic Perron) The function w+ is an USC viscosity sub-solution of the
(lower) Isaacs equation.
Proof: 1. Interior sub-solution property Let ψ touch w+ strictly above at some (t0, x0) ∈
[0, T )× Rd. Assume, by contradiction, that
ψt(t0, x0) + sup
u
inf
v
L(t0, x0, u, v;ψx(t0, x0), ψxx(t0, x0))) < 0.
This means that there exists a small ε > 0 and a (measurable) function h : U → V such that
ψt(t0, x0) + L(t0, x0, u, h(u);ψx(t0, x0), ψxx(t0, x0))) < −ε.
Since L is continuous (so uniformly continuous over (t, x, u, v, p,M) as long as (t, x) is close to (t0, x0)
and (p.M) is close to (ψx(t0, x0), ψxx(t0, x0))), we can choose an even smaller ε such that
ψt(t, x) + L(t, x, u, h(u);ψx(t, x), ψxx(t, x))) < −ε
over the (smaller) neighborhood B(t0, x0; ε) ⊂ [0, T ) × Rd. From here on, we follow the usual Perron
construction. We need to show that after we “bump down” (an approximation of) w+, it still stays
an asymptotic super-solution. Since ψ touches w+ above in a strict sense, there exists room of
size δ > 0 in between w+ and ψ over the compact (rectangular) torus
T , B(t0, x0, ε)−B(t0, x0, ε/2),
i.e. w+ ≤ ψ − δ on T. Again a Dini type argument (see, for example, [BS14]) shows that, one of the
terms of the sequence wn ց w+, which we simply denote by w, actually satisfies w ≤ ψ − δ/2 on T.
Define now, for 0 < ρ << δ/2 the function
vˆ =
{
w ∧ (ψ − ρ), on B(t0, x0; ε)
w, outside B(t0, x0; ε).
We have that vˆ = w on the overlapping T (so, vˆ it is continuous) and vˆ(t0, x0) = w
+(t0, x0) − ρ <
w+(t0, x0). We only need to show that vˆ is an asymptotic super-solution to have a full proof. Fix
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s ≤ r ≤ T . Since w is an asymptotic super-solution in the sense of Definition 3.8, there exists an
η : Rd × U → V at time r corresponding to the Definition 3.8 for the super-solution w (for the initial
time s). Define
ηˆ(x, u) = 1{(r,x)/∈B(t0,x0;ε/2)∨w(r,x)≤ψ(r,x)−ρ}η(x, r) + 1{(r,x)∈B(t0 ,x0;ε/2)∧w(r,x)>ψ(r,x)−ρ}h(u). (11)
Remark 3.12 The choice of h(u) together with Itoˆ formula tells as that, as long as the player v always
adjusts his/her control (observing continuously the other player’s actions) to be h(ut) and (t,Xt) is
inside B(t0, x0; ε) then (ψ − ρ)(t,Xt) is a super-martingale.
Now, some very similar arguments to the considerations in Subsection 3.1 based on the Remark above
and a (next to) identical result to Lemma 3.7 finish the proof of vˆ ∈ U , resulting in a contradiction. ⋄
2. The Terminal condition w+(T, ·) ≤ g(·) One has to use identical arguments to the proof
of w−(T, ·) ≥ g(·) in Subsection 3.1 (which was, in turn, apparent), with the only difference of
constructing a counter-strategy similar to (11) in order to reach a contradiction to the assumption
that w+(T, x0) > g(x0) for some x0.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2.7
Recall that w− ≤ v−M ≤ v− ≤ W− = V − ≤ W+ ≤ v+ ≤ v+M ≤ w+. Since w− is a LSC viscosity
super-solution and w+ is an USC sub-solution of the lower Isaacs equation, the comparison result in
[S1ˆ4c] ensures that
v−M = v
− =W− = V − =W+ = v+ = v+M .
As mentioned before, if one does not really care about the genuine non-symmetric game (5) and it’s
value/saddle points, then only the the lower Perron construction
w− ≤ v−M ≤ v− ≤ V −
is needed. The viscosity super-solution property of w− together with the viscosity property of V −
from [S1ˆ4c] (which is actually re-proved above) yields the more important half of the Theorem 2.7,
which is
v−M = v
− = V −.
Now, in order to prove the second part of Theorem 2.7, we note that we have constructed L ∋ wn ր
W−. By continuity and the Dini’s criterion, the above convergence is uniform on compacts. This
means that, for each ε there exists w ∈ L (one of the terms of the increasing sequence of asymptotic
sub-solutions) such that
W− − ε ≤ w, on C = [0, T ] × {|x| ≤ N}.
Let ϕ be the gauge function of this particular w, and let δ such that ϕ(δ) ≤ ε. According to the proof
of Proposition 3.3, if |π| ≤ δ, there exists αˆ ∈ AM (s, π) such that
w(s, x) ≤ inf
v∈V
E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,vT )] + ε× (T − s) ∀x.
This implies that
W−(s, x)− ε× (1 + (T − s)) ≤ inf
v∈V(s)
E[g(Xs,x;αˆ,vT )] ≤ v−pi (s, x), ∀|x| ≤ N.
A very similar argument based on Dini, together with Proposition 3.9 shows that, for ‖π‖ ≤ δ(ε) (here
δ(ε) may have to be modified) there exists a counter-strategy γˆ ∈ C(π, s) such that
W+(s, x) + ε× (1 + (T − s)) ≥ sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;u,γˆT )] ≥ v+pi (s, x), ∀|x| ≤ N.
Not only that the approximations are uniform on C, but, for fixed time s, the uniform approximations
can be realized over the same simple Markov strategy αˆ ∈ AM(s, π) or the same Markov counter-
strategy γˆ ∈ CM (s, π) for |π| ≤ δ. ⋄
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4 Final Considerations
4.1 One player/control problems
In case the state system only depends on u and not on v (i.e. we have a control problem rather than
a game), then, with the obvious observation that
v−M (s, x) ≤ V −(s, x) ≤ sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;uT )],
one can use our result about games to conclude that, in a control problem (one-player) like in [BS13]
(but under our stronger standing assumptions here), the value functions over open-loop controls,
elementary feed-back strategies and simple Markov strategies coincide. In addition, the approximation
with simple Markov strategies is uniform over the mesh of the grid, uniform on compacts. We remind
the reader that, in [BS13], the value function studied was defined over open-loop controls, i.e.
Vol(s, x) , sup
u∈U(s)
E[g(Xs,x;uT )].
In this case, as pointed out in Remark 3.2, we can actually use the analytic formulation of asymptotic
solutions. Up to some considerations related to the Markov property of SDE’s and some other small
technical considerations (filtration, and local Lipschitz condition), this result is the same as Theorem
2 on page 148 in the seminal monograph [Kry09]. Again, we just present a novel method to prove
such a result.
4.2 Values for symmetric feedback games
In the case of symmetric feedback games, if the Isaacs condition is satisfied, we know from [S1ˆ4c] that
the game has a value. Applying the asymptotic Perron method over strategies in Subsection 3.1 to
both players (on both sides) we obtain that, for each ε, there exist ε-saddle point within the class of
simple Markov strategies, uniformly in bounded x, which means (α(ε), β(ε)) ∈ AM (s) × BM (s) such
that
E[g(X
s,x;u,β(ε)
T ]− ε ≤ E[g(Xs,x;α(ε),β(ε)T ] ≤ E[g(Xs,x;α(ε),vT ] + ε (∀) (u, v) ∈ U(s)× V(s), |x| ≤ N.
If the Isaacs condition fails, we can still model the game, in a martingale formulation, as in
[S1ˆ4b], and a value over feed-back mixed/relaxed strategies does exist. Using again the Asymptotic
Perron’s method, for both players, we can obtain the existence of ε-saddle point within the class of
mixed/relaxed strategies of simple Markov type, uniformly in bounded x. A mixed strategy µ of simple
Markov type (for the player u) is defined by a time grid π and some functions ξk : R
d → P(U), k =
1, . . . , n measurable, such that
µ(t, y(·)) =
n∑
k=1
1{tk−1<t≤tk}ξk(y(tk−1) ∈ P(U).
In other words, player u decides at time tk−1 based only on the position at that time, what distribution
he/she will be sampling continuously from until tk. Obviously, one can define similarly mixed
strategies of Markov type for the v-player. In order to do the analysis and obtain the approximate
mixed Markov saddle strategies, one would have to go inside the short proofs in [S1ˆ4b] and apply
Asymptotic Perron’s Method for the auxiliary (and strongly defined) games in the proofs there. In
other words, the above paragraph for games over pure strategies satisfying Isaacs condition applies
to the auxiliary game in [S1ˆ4b], leading to ε-saddle points in the class of mixed strategies of Markov
type for the original game.
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